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Confidence is an essential ingredient of success in a wide range of domains ranging 
from job performance and mental health, to sports, business, and combat
1-4
. Some 
authors have suggested that not just confidence but overconfidence—believing you 
are better than you are in reality—is advantageous because it serves to increase 
ambition, morale, resolve, persistence, or the credibility of bluffing, generating a 
self-fulfilling prophecy in which exaggerated confidence actually increases the 
probability of success
3-8
. However, overconfidence also leads to faulty assessments, 
unrealistic expectations, and hazardous decisions, so it remains a puzzle how such 
a false belief could evolve or remain stable in a population of competing strategies 
that include accurate, unbiased beliefs. Here, we present an evolutionary model 
showing that, counter-intuitively, overconfidence maximizes individual fitness and 
populations will tend to become overconfident, as long as benefits from contested 
resources are sufficiently large compared to the cost of competition. In contrast, 
“rational” unbiased strategies are only stable under limited conditions. The fact 
that overconfident populations are evolutionarily stable in a wide range of 
environments may help to explain why overconfidence remains prevalent today, 
even if it contributes to hubris, market bubbles, financial collapses, policy failures, 
disasters, and costly wars
9-13
. 
Humans exhibit many psychological biases, but one of the most consistent, 
powerful, and widespread is overconfidence. Most people show a bias towards: (1) 
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exaggerated personal qualities and capabilities; (2) an illusion of control over events; 
and (3) invulnerability to risk (three phenomena collectively known as “positive 
illusions”)
2-4,14
. Overconfidence amounts to an “error” of judgment or decision-making, 
because it leads to overestimating one’s capabilities, and/or underestimating an 
opponent, the difficulty of a task, or possible risks. It is therefore no surprise that 
overconfidence has been blamed throughout history for high-profile disasters such as 
World War I, the Vietnam war, the war in Iraq, the 2008 financial crisis, and the ill 
preparedness for environmental phenomena like Hurricane Katrina and climate 
change
9,12,13,15,16
. 
If overconfidence is both a widespread feature of human psychology and causes 
costly mistakes, we are faced with an evolutionary puzzle as to why humans should 
have evolved or maintained such an apparently damaging bias. One possible solution is 
that overconfidence can actually be advantageous on average (even if costly at times), 
because it boosts ambition, morale, resolve, persistence, or the credibility of bluffing. If 
such features increase net payoffs in competition or conflict, then overconfidence may 
have been favoured by natural selection over the course of human evolutionary history
5-
8
. 
However, it is unclear whether such a bias can evolve in realistic competition with 
alternative strategies. The null hypothesis is that biases would die out, because they lead 
to faulty assessments and suboptimal behaviour. In fact, a large class of economic 
models depend on the assumption that biases in beliefs do not exist
17
. Underlying this 
assumption is the idea that there must be some evolutionary or learning process that 
causes individuals with correct beliefs to be rewarded (and thus to spread at the expense 
of incorrect beliefs). However, unbiased decisions are not necessarily the best strategy 
for maximizing benefits over costs, especially under conditions of competition, 
uncertainty, and asymmetric costs of different types of errors
8,18-21
. While economists 
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tend to posit the notion of human brains as general-purpose utility maximizing machines 
that evaluate the costs, benefits, and probabilities of different options on a case-by-case 
basis, natural selection may have favoured the development of simple heuristic biases 
(such as overconfidence) in a given domain because they were more economical, 
available, or faster. 
Here, we present a model showing that, under plausible conditions for the value of 
rewards, the cost of conflict, and uncertainty about the capability of competitors, there 
can be material rewards for holding incorrect beliefs about one’s own capability. These 
adaptive advantages of overconfidence may explain its emergence and spread in 
humans, other animals or indeed any interacting entities (by a process of trial and error, 
imitation, learning, or selection). The scenario we model—a competition for 
resources—is simple but general, thereby capturing the essence of a broad range of 
competitive interactions including animal conflict, strategic decision-making, market 
competition, litigation, finance, and war.  
Suppose a resource r is available to an individual that claims it, and there are two 
individuals, i and j. These individuals each have initial “capability” !i and !j that 
determine whether or not they would win a conflict over the resource. Without loss of 
generality, we assume ! is distributed in the population according to a symmetric stable 
probability density
22
 with cumulative distribution !, mean 0, and variance 
! 
1/2 .  The 
initial advantage to individual i is a = !i " !j, and assumptions about the distribution of ! 
imply that the probability density of a has a cumulative distribution !, mean 0, and unit 
variance (Supplementary Information Sec. 1).  
If neither individual claims the resource then no fitness is gained. If only one 
makes a claim, then the claimant acquires the resource and gains fitness r and the other 
individual gains nothing. If both claim the resource, then both pay a cost c due to the 
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conflict between them, but the individual with the higher initial capability will win the 
conflict, acquiring the resource and obtaining fitness r. This means there are only three 
outcomes that have an impact on an individual’s fitness: winning a conflict (W); losing a 
conflict (L); and obtaining an unclaimed resource (O).  Given the probability of each of 
these outcomes (pW, pL and pO), the benefits of obtaining the resource r, and the costs of 
conflict c, the expected fitness is 
! 
E f( ) = pW r " c( ) + pL "c( ) + pO r( ) . Note that r and c 
can denote expected benefits and costs—if conflict outcomes were made probabilistic 
instead of deterministic, the results would not change. 
Individuals choose whether or not to claim a resource based on their perceived 
capability relative to the capability of other claimants.  If there were no uncertainty in 
this assessment, there would never be a conflict because the dispute can be settled 
without cost (the stronger individual takes the resource, and the weaker individual 
surrenders it, allowing both agents to avoid c)
23-26
. In the real world, however, 
uncertainty is common. We therefore model individuals’ uncertainty about their 
opponent’s capability by adding an error term 
! 
"  to the opponent’s capability such that 
individual i thinks the capability of individual j is 
! 
" j + # i . To derive analytical results, 
we assume that this perception error has a magnitude of 
! 
" > 0  and is binomially 
distributed, with 
! 
Pr " = #( ) = Pr " = $#( ) = 0.5  (the “binomial model”). To evaluate the 
role of confidence, we allow individuals to perceive their own capability as 
! 
" + k , 
where 
! 
k = 0 indicates unbiased individuals who perceive their capability correctly, 
! 
k > 0 indicates overconfident individuals who think they are stronger than they actually 
are, and 
! 
k < 0 indicates underconfident individuals who think they are weaker than they 
actually are. 
We explore the emergence and stability of biases in hypothetical populations 
using standard assumptions about evolutionary dynamics
27
 under which the most fit are 
more likely to survive or reproduce, or the less fit are more likely to copy better 
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strategies. Fig. 1a shows regions of the parameter space and five equilibria that occur in 
the binomial model, all confirmed both analytically and numerically (see 
Supplementary Information Sec. 2). 
When 
! 
r /c > 3/2, the unique equilibrium is a pure (monomorphic) population of 
overconfident individuals, all of whom evolve a level of overconfidence that is equal to 
the size of the perception error (
! 
k
*
= " ). As long as there is at least some perception 
error, overconfident individuals resist invasion by all other individuals, including 
underconfident (
! 
k < 0), unbiased (
! 
k = 0), and other kinds of overconfident individuals (
! 
k > 0).  
When 
! 
1/3 < r /c < 3/2, there are two equilibria. First, a mixed (polymorphic) 
population made up of overconfident individuals (
! 
k
*
= " ) and underconfident 
individuals (
! 
k
*
= "#) is always possible as long as there is at least some perception 
error. Second, an unbiased equilibrium (
! 
k
*
= 0), is also possible in this region, but only 
if the perception error is sufficiently low. 
Finally, when 
! 
r /c <1/3 there are two more equilibria. A pure equilibrium of 
underconfident individuals (
! 
k
*
= "#) is always possible, and a mixed equilibrium of 
very underconfident (
! 
k
*
= "2#) and unbiased (
! 
k
*
= 0) individuals is possible when there 
is a moderate amount of uncertainty. 
The underlying assumptions of the binomial model are deliberately simple in 
order to make closed-form characterizations tractable. We also used numerical 
simulation methods to evaluate the model when we allow the perception error 
! 
"  to vary 
continuously using a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 
! 
" (the 
“normal model”). This assumption may be more realistic than the binomial assumption 
since it allows perception errors to vary in magnitude. 
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As with the binomial model, the normal model shows that overconfidence (
! 
k
*
> 0
) is the unique pure equilibrium when the benefit/cost ratio is high enough 
(approximately 
! 
r /c > 0.7 , see Fig. 1b), which is notably less stringent than the binomial 
model reported above. When the benefit/cost ratio falls below this critical value, the 
unique pure equilibrium is underconfidence (
! 
k
*
< 0). If there is any perception error 
whatsoever, an absence of bias is only an equilibrium at a single point—the value of 
resources and the cost of conflict must be in perfect balance to eliminate bias (Fig.1 b). 
This result suggests that models based on the assumption that individuals perceive their 
own capabilities without bias
17
 are unrealistic—any small change in the benefit/cost 
ratio will tilt the advantage away from “rational” individuals towards those that assume 
they are more or less capable than they really are. 
The normal model also yields the same positive relationship between perception 
error and confidence that was derived in the binomial model. As uncertainty about 
opponent capabilities increases, it becomes more advantageous to express stronger bias 
(the overconfident become even more confident and the underconfident become even 
less confident). 
The simulations allowed us to examine some extensions of the model (see 
Supplementary Information Sec. 3). If we generalize the model to 3 players, 
overconfidence is favoured at the same threshold (
! 
r /c > 0.7). Results are also robust if 
we allow conflict costs to vary between winners and losers. The threshold required for 
overconfidence decreases as losers suffer relatively more. For example, overconfidence 
evolves when 
! 
r /c > 0.6  if the costs to the winner are 0.8c, and it evolves when 
! 
r /c > 0.45  if the costs to the winner are 0.2c. In other words, when conflict for the 
winner is cheap, overconfidence is even more likely to evolve and persist. 
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Our model shares interesting parallels with the famous Hawk-Dove game in 
evolutionary game theory
24
. “Hawks” escalate until they win (with benefit b), or sustain 
significant injury (with cost c). “Doves” only display, and retreat if attacked. Where b > 
c, Hawks take over the population and animals always fight. Where c > b, a mixed 
population of Hawks and Doves emerges. The Hawk-Dove game is important because it 
shows that (where c > b) contests can be resolved by “conventional” signals (displays 
only) with minimal fighting—explaining why many animals have dangerous weapons 
(such as sharp horns or teeth) but death is rare.  
We find that the Hawk-Dove game is a special case of our model, where the only 
possible strategies are to be infinitely overconfident (
! 
k =" , i.e. Hawk) and therefore 
always claim the resource, or infinitely underconfident (
! 
k = "# , i.e. Dove) and 
therefore never claim. In Supplementary Information (Sec. 4) we show that the standard 
equilibria of the Hawk-Dove game emerge under these conditions. Strikingly, however, 
somewhat overconfident (but not infinitely overconfident) individuals always beat both 
Hawk and Dove. Our model, therefore, shows that individuals with a more nuanced 
strategy—even a biased one—do better than the “extreme” strategies of Hawk and 
Dove. Moreover, hawkish (overconfident) strategies can dominate even where 
! 
c > r , a 
finding that contrasts with previous Hawk-Dove models. 
One important implication of the model is that environments with more valuable 
resources will generate more conflict (Supplementary Information Sec. 5). This parallels 
the finding in the animal fighting literature that, where very valuable resources are at 
stake, hawkish strategies become more common and, in contrast to much animal 
conflict that is ritualized and restrained, fighting under these conditions can become 
lethal
28
. 
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The analysis here demonstrates that overconfidence often prevails over accurate 
assessment.  Overconfidence is advantageous because it encourages individuals to claim 
resources they could not otherwise win if it came to a conflict (stronger but cautious 
rivals will sometimes fail to make a claim) and it keeps them from walking away from 
resources they would surely win. These results conform with previous observations that 
systematic overestimates of the probability of winning simple gambling games can be 
adaptive if the benefits of the resource at stake sufficiently exceed the costs of 
attempting to gain it
19,20
, that aggressive strategies (like “Hawk” in Hawk-Dove games) 
are favoured if the advantages of winning exceed the costs of injury
24
, and that 
overconfident states outperform others in an agent-based model of conflict
29
.  
Note that overconfidence in our model is purely self-deception—there is no other-
deception (“bluffing”) because there is no signalling of k (opponents are not gullible to 
others’ inflated beliefs). This is important because it demonstrates that there are 
adaptive advantages of overconfidence irrespective of any possible (additional) 
advantages of bluffing. Bluffing is often argued to be unstable in nature because there 
would be strong selection on discriminating responses. However, this may be partly 
why self-deception evolved, in Robert Trivers’ words: “hiding the truth from yourself to 
hide it more deeply from others”
6,7
. Previous work has also shown that bluffing can 
survive counter-selection if there is ambiguity in one’s own or others’ strengths. If so, 
bluffs and reality cannot be reliably distinguished, and calling others’ bluff takes on a 
cost of its own. Maynard Smith and Parker (1976) suggested that bluffing is therefore 
more likely (even if it is detectable in principle) among animals in which serious injury 
is possible—i.e. those with weapons—because the costs of calling a bluff can be high. 
Our model applies to any replicating entity or any species, but it has particular 
implications for humans. First, if contested resources were sufficiently valuable 
compared to the costs of competing for them during human evolutionary history, we 
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might expect humans to have evolved a bias towards overconfidence
5,12,19,20
. Such an 
outcome is exactly what the experimental psychology literature has long demonstrated, 
and yet has lacked an explanation for its origin
2-4,14
. A recent review of whether any 
“false beliefs” could be biologically adaptive concluded that there is just a single 
compelling candidate: positive illusions
8
. Today, we may retain evolved proximate 
mechanisms that give rise to overconfidence even in situations where the costs of 
conflict have increased relative to the value of the reward, making it maladaptive in 
many modern settings (such as, perhaps, in interpersonal aggression and war). 
Second, overconfidence may arise and spread more quickly among humans than 
other organisms. Rather than relying on genetic mutation and natural selection over 
many generations, overconfidence in humans can emerge and spread much more rapidly 
by other means such as trial and error, imitation, or learning (which may also generate 
considerable variation among different “ecological” contexts such as habitats, cultures, 
or organizations). These processes of cultural selection may affect the way strategies 
emerge, survive and spread today among interacting entities, whether individuals, 
groups, negotiators, lawyers, traders, banks, sports teams, firms, armies, or states. In 
many of these settings, overconfidence may pay on average even though it only attracts 
attention when it causes costly disasters, or when the environment (the 
! 
r /c  ratio) 
changes such that overconfidence begins to generate net costs.  
Other recent models have explored the evolution of risk preferences
30
 but in the 
present model individuals do not prefer or avoid risk—their heuristic is simply to assess 
capabilities and claim the resource if they perceive a capability gap.  Interestingly, as we 
show in Supplementary Information (Sec. 6), this heuristic causes individuals to behave 
as if they were calculating the expected outcome of a risky choice under a specific set of 
assumptions about themselves and their opponents and comparing it to a required risk 
premium, which is cognitively a much more demanding task. Thus, although it is 
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possible that risk preferences contribute to behaviour in competition and conflict, the 
simpler mechanism of overconfidence provides a short-cut that yields equivalent 
outcomes. Such short-cuts may have been favoured in our evolution because they have 
lower operating costs, were more easily available to natural selection, or reach decisions 
faster. In fact, there are many examples of biases in human judgment and decision-
making that appear to be adaptive precisely because they offer simple heuristics that 
deceive us into fitness maximizing behaviour
18,20
. 
The finding that the optimal level of bias increases with the magnitude of 
uncertainty is especially intriguing. It suggests that we should expect extreme levels of 
overconfidence (hubris) or underconfidence (fear) precisely when we are dealing with 
unfamiliar or poorly understood strategic contexts. We predict that—where the value of 
a prize sufficiently exceeds the costs of competing—overconfidence will be particularly 
prevalent in some very important domains that have inherently high levels of 
uncertainty, including: international relations (where events are complex, distant, and 
involve foreign cultures and languages), rare or unpredictable phenomena (such as 
natural disasters and climate change), novel or complex technologies (such as the 
internet bubble and modern financial instruments), and new and untested leaders, allies, 
and enemies. Although overconfidence may have been adaptive in our past, and may 
still be adaptive in some settings today, it appears that we are likely to become 
overconfident in precisely the most dangerous of scenarios. 
Supplementary Information accompanies the paper. 
Acknowledgements: We thank D. Blumstein, L.-E. Cederman, D. Fessler, P. Go#ev, M. Haselton, D. 
Nettle, J. Orbell, K. Panchanathan, R. Trivers, N. Weidmann and R. Wrangham for discussions and help 
leading to this paper, and an anonymous referee for an impressive series of detailed analyses of our 
models. We have no competing interests to declare. 
  11 
Author Contributions: D.J. and J.F. conceived the study. J.F. performed the modelling. D.J. and J.F. 
analyzed the results, revised the models, and wrote the paper. 
Author Information: Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to D.J. (e-mail: 
dominic.johnson@ed.ac.uk). 
 
References 
1 Kanter, R. M. Confidence: How Winning Streaks and Losing Streaks Begin and 
End. (Crown Business, New York, 2004). 
2 Taylor, S. E. & Brown, J. D. Positive illusions and well-being revisited: 
separating fact from fiction. Psychological Bulletin 116 (1), 21 (1994). 
3 Taylor, S. E. Positive Illusions: Creative Self-Deception and the Healthy Mind. 
(Basic Books, New York, 1989). 
4 Peterson, C. A Primer in Positive Psychology. (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2006). 
5 Wrangham, R. W. Is military incompetence adaptive? Evolution and Human 
Behaviour 20, 3 (1999). 
6 Trivers, R. L. The elements of a scientific theory of self-deception. Annals of the 
New York Academy of Sciences 907, 114 (2000). 
7 Trivers, R. Deceit and Self-Deception: Fooling Yourself the Better to Fool 
Others. (Allen Lane, London, 2011). 
8 McKay, R. T. & Dennett, D. C. The evolution of misbelief. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences 32, 493 (2009). 
9 Tuchman, B. W. The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam. (Alfred A. Knopf, 
New York, 1984). 
  12 
10 Camerer, C. & Lovallo, D. Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental 
Approach. The American Economic Review 89 (1), 306 (1999). 
11 Malmendier, U. & Tate, G. C.E.O. overconfidence and corporate investment. 
The Journal of Finance 60 (6), 2661 (2005). 
12 Johnson, D. D. P. Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive 
Illusions. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, M.A., 2004). 
13 Johnson, D. D. P. & Tierney, D. R. The Rubicon theory of war: How the path to 
conflict reaches the point of no return. International Security 36 (1), 7 (2011). 
14 Sharot, T. The Optimism Bias: A Tour of The Irrationally Positive Brain. 
(Pantheon, New York, 2011). 
15 Johnson, D. D. P. & Levin, S. A. The tragedy of cognition: psychological biases 
and environmental inaction. Current Science 97 (11), 1593 (2009). 
16 Akerlof, G. A. & Shiller, R. J. Animal spirits: how human psychology drives the 
economy, and why it matters for global capitalism. (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 2009). 
17 Fudenberg, D. & Tirole, J. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential 
Equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory 53 (2), 236 (1991). 
18 Gigerenzer, G. Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World. (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2002). 
19 Nettle, D. in Emotion, Evolution and Rationality, edited by Evans, D. & Cruse, 
P. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004), pp. 193. 
20 Haselton, M. G. & Nettle, D. The Paranoid Optimist: An Integrative 
Evolutionary Model of Cognitive Biases. Personality and Social Psychology Review 10 
(1), 47 (2006). 
  13 
21 Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. Better than rational: Evolutionary psychology and the 
invisible hand. American Economic Review 84 (2), 327 (1994). 
22 Fama, E. F. & Roll, R. Some properties of symmetric stable distributions. 
Journal of the American Statistical Association 63 (323), 817 (1968). 
23 Fearon, J. D. Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization 49 (3), 
379 (1995). 
24 Maynard Smith, J. & Parker, G. The logic of asymmetric contests. Animal 
Behavior 24, 159 (1976). 
25 Parker, G. A. Assessment strategy and the evolution of fighting behaviour. 
Journal of Theoretical Biology 47, 223 (1974). 
26 Enquist, M. & Leimar, O. Evolution of fighting behaviour: decision rules and 
assessment of relative strength. Journal of Theoretical Biology 102, 387 (1983). 
27 Weibull, J. Evolutionary Game Theory. (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995). 
28 Enquist, M. & Leimar, O. The evolution of fatal fighting. Animal Behaviour 39, 
1 (1990). 
29 Johnson, D. D. P., Weidmann, N. B., & Cederman, L.-E. Fortune favours the 
bold: An agent-based model reveals adaptive advantages of overconfidence in war. 
PLoS ONE 6 (6), e20851 (2011). 
30 McDermott, R., Fowler, J. H., & Smirnov, O. On the evolutionary origin of 
prospect theory preferences Journal of Politics 70 (2), 335 (2008). 
 
 
  14 
 
Figure 1. Best performing levels of confidence across different parameter 
values. The top panels show equilibrium levels of confidence k* for varying 
benefit/cost ratios (r/c) and degrees of uncertainty about the capabilities of 
competitors when assessment errors are modelled using a binomial distribution 
(a) or a normal distribution (b). Each point shows the results from a single 
simulation where the cost, benefit, and degree of uncertainty were drawn from a 
uniform distribution (see SI). There were 10,000 simulations in total. Shapes 
indicate types of equilibria that exist for a given parameter combination (filled 
shapes indicate unbiased strategies are not possible), and colours indicate the 
degree of uncertainty. The bottom panels show the same results for the 
binomial (c) and normal (d) models as a function of costs and benefits (colours 
indicate what kind of equilibria are possible; these results hold for all levels of 
perception error). Both models show that overconfident strategies are the 
unique equilibrium when the benefit/cost ratio is sufficiently high, and unbiased 
strategies are only possible under limited conditions. 
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1 The Model
Suppose a resource r is potentially available to an individual that claims
it. Suppose further that there are two individuals that can claim this re-
source, i and j. These individuals each have a “capability” θi and θj which
will determine whether or not they would win a conflict over the resource.
Without loss of generality, we assume θ is distributed in the population
according to a symmetric stable probability density1 φ with cumulative dis-
tribution Φ, mean 0, and variance
√
1/2. The endowment advantage to
individual i is a = θi − θj, and assumptions about the distribution of θ
imply that the probability density of a has a cumulative distribution of Φ,
mean 0, and variance 1.
If neither individual claims the resource then no fitness is gained. If only
one individual makes a claim, then it acquires the resource and gains fitness
r and the other individual gains nothing. If both individuals claim the
resource, then both individuals pay a cost c due to the conflict between
them, but the individual with the higher initial endowment will win the
conflict and also obtain fitness r for acquiring it.
An individual chooses whether or not to claim a resource based on only
two pieces of information: their perception of their own capability and
their perception of the capability of the other individual. If there were no
uncertainty in this assessment, there would never be a conflict—the less
capable individual would let the more capable individual claim the resource
in order to avoid the costs of conflict in a fight they are bound to lose.
We model an individual’s uncertainty about their opponent’s capability by
adding a binomial error term: individual i thinks the capability of individual
j is θj + νi. We assume that this perception error is unbiased, with Pr(ν =
$) = 0.5 and Pr(ν = −$) = 0.5, and that perception errors of different
individuals are independent of one another.
Assessments of capabilities can be wrong in two ways. First, there may be
errors in the assessment of self or other. Second, there may be a bias in the
assessment of self or other. Because it is relative capabilities that matter,
1This class of distributions includes the normal distribution. For more on these
distributions, see Fama, E.F., Roll, R. 1968. Some properties of symmetric stable distri-
butions. Journal of the American Statistical Association 63(323):817–836.
3
any error or bias in assessments of oneself are equivalent to error or bias in
assessments of others. So technically it does not matter to which individual
each source of mistake is assigned. Here, however, we assign error to the
assessment of others (because error is likely and realistic when one does not
have full information about other agents), and bias to the assessment of self
(because one does have full information about oneself, and yet psychologists
have shown that individuals tend to be biased in self-assessments).
Notice that this setup is deliberately designed to capture the broadest and
most generalizable elements of conflict of many types, including animal
fighting, war, competition for resources, legal battles, bargaining, and so
on. It allows us to model conflict over any resource of value, regardless
of whether or not it is possessed – as long as a resource has not been con-
sumed, it could potentially be “claimed” and derive benefit to the claimant.
Notice also that although we assume that the outcome of conflict is a de-
terministic function of a, this is a random variable because of the capability
distribution. Thus, we could equally assume that the probability of winning
depends on a capability difference b and a conflict-specific random variable
ψ, and if this generates the same distribution (Pr(a > 0) = Pr(b + ψ))
then this probabilistic model will be equivalent to the deterministic model.
Finally, notice that we do not assume conflict is a function of costs or ben-
efits. As we will see, there is a relationship, but it arises endogenously as a
consequence of other assumptions of the model.
To evaluate the role of confidence, we assume that individuals perceive their
own capability as θ + k, where k = 0 indicates unbiased individuals that
perceive their capability correctly, k > 0 indicates overconfident individuals
that think they are more capable than they actually are, and k < 0 indi-
cates underconfident individuals that think they are less capable than they
actually are.
There are, of course, many possible ways to model the mapping from ca-
pabilities and confidence to a decision under uncertainty (for example, one
could assume that bias is a proportion of capability rather than a fixed
amount that is independent of capability). One implication of the func-
tional form we have chosen is that bias can apply equivalently to percep-
tion of one’s own capability and perception of the opponent’s capability
(in other words, overconfidence can result either from under-estimating the
4
opponent’s capability or over-estimating one’s own).
We assume individual i only chooses to claim a resource if they think they
could win a conflict over it (θi+ki > θj+νi), and conflict only occurs if the
opponent also claims the resource (if θj + kj > θi+ νj). Furthermore, when
one individual claims a resource and the other does not, then the resource
goes to the claimant. This means there are only three outcomes that have
an impact on an individual’s fitness, 1) winning a conflict (W ), 2) losing a
conflict (L), and 3) obtaining an unclaimed resource (O). The probabilities
of these three events can be expressed as follows:
pW =Pr(θi + ki > θj + νi; θj + kj > θi + νj; θi > θj) =
Pr(νi − ki < a; a < kj − νj; 0 < a)
pL =Pr(θi + ki > θj + νi; θj + kj > θi + νj; θj > θi) = (1)
Pr(νi − ki < a; a < kj − νj; a < 0)
pO =Pr(θi + ki > θj + νi; θj + kj < θi + νj) =
Pr(νi − ki < a; a > kj − νj)
There are four equally likely conditions we need to check in order to specify
an equation for each probability. For example:
pW =
1
4
[pW (νi = #; νj = #) + pW (νi = −#; νj = #)+
pW (νi = #; νj = −#) + pW (νi = −#; νj = −#)] (2)
In some cases we also need to check whether the level of confidence k is
greater or less than the magnitude of the perception error #. For example,
notice that when both individuals draw a positive #,
pW (νi = νj = #) = Pr(#− ki < a; a < kj − #; 0 < a)
= Pr(max(0, #− ki) < a < kj − #)
=
{
Φ(kj − #)− Φ(#− ki) if ki ≤ # and
Φ(kj − #)− 12 otherwise.
(3)
Thus it is a simple (but tedious) exercise to derive the complete proba-
bilities by fixing k relative to # and then deriving the probability for each
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interval. For example, for monomorphic populations (where k = ki = kj)
the probabilities reduce to:
pW = pL =

0 if k ≤ −!
1
4Φ(!+ k)− 18 if −! ≤ k ≤ 0
1
2Φ(!+ k)− 14(!− k)− 18 if 0 ≤ k ≤ !
1
2Φ(!+ k)− 12(!− k) if ! ≤ k
pO =

1
2Φ(!+ k)− 12Φ(!− k) + 12 if k ≤ −!−12Φ(!− k) + 34 if −! ≤ k ≤ 0−12Φ(!+ k) + 34 if 0 ≤ k ≤ !−12Φ(!+ k) + 12(!− k) + 12 if ! ≤ k
(4)
Given the benefits of obtaining the resource (r) and the costs of conflict (c),
the expected fitness is
E(f) = pW (r − c) + pL(−c) + pO(r) (5)
which for monomorphic populations simplifies to
=

(
1
2Φ(!+ k)− 12Φ(!− k) + 12
)
r if k ≤ −!(
1
4Φ(!+ k)− 12Φ(!− k) + 58
)
r − (12Φ(!+ k)− 14) c if −! ≤ k ≤ 0(−14Φ(!− k) + 58) r − (Φ(!+ k)− 12Φ(!− k)− 14) c if 0 ≤ k ≤ !
1
2r − (Φ(!+ k)− Φ(!− k)) c if ! ≤ k
(6)
In the next section we identify five equilibria that result from this model
under the assumption that the perception error is binomial. We later use
computer simulations to validate this analysis and then see what equilib-
ria result when we change to an assumption that the perception error is
normally distributed.
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2 Five Equilibria of the Binomial Model
Here we present analytic characterizations of equilibria of the binomial
model that resulted when we used numerical simulation to search the pa-
rameter space. To determine whether or not a population is in equilibrium,
we checked to see whether an alternative strategy (an “invader”) could
survive in that population). This search revealed that fitness is always in-
creasing in the confidence of the invader (ki) for ki < −2! and decreasing
for ki > 2!. Graphical inspection of the fitness function shows that dis-
continuities appear at ki = {−2!,−!, 0, !, 2!} so we checked for equilibria
for all pairwise combinations (including a strategy against itself) of these
types. This search yielded three pure equilibria and two mixed equilibria
as identified in the following sections.
2.1 Overconfident Populations (kj = !)
Here we show that a population of individuals with kj = ! resists invasion
by all possible types (−∞ < ki <∞) as long as rc > 32 .
We start with types that have a confidence level greater than the population
overconfidence level (ki > !). When an individual of type ki enters an
overconfident population (kj = !), the individual’s expected fitness is:
1
2
r −
(
1
2
Φ(2!) +
1
2
Φ(ki − !) + 1
2
Φ(ki + !)− 3
4
)
c (7)
Since Φ (the cumulative distribution of the capability difference) is increas-
ing in ki, higher values of ki yield greater expected costs, and invaders
always do better when ki = ! than when ki > !. Therefore, no individual
with ki > ! can invade a population where kj = !.
We can use the same reasoning to show that types with lower confidence
ki < ! are also incapable of invading. Given discontinuities in the fitness
function, we need to check three conditions for a type ki: −! ≤ ki < !,
−3! ≤ ki ≤ −!, and ki ≤ −3!.
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When −! ≤ ki < !, the expected fitness of an invader is:(
1
2
Φ(ki − !) + 1
4
)
r −
(
1
2
Φ(2!) +
1
4
Φ(ki − !) + 1
2
Φ(ki + !)− 5
8
)
c
(8)
This fitness is less than the average population fitness when:
r
c
>
Φ(ki + !)− Φ(2!)
Φ(ki − !)− 12
+
1
2
(9)
Note that the right hand side is less than 32 if
Φ(2!)− Φ(ki + !) + Φ(ki − !)− 1
2
< 0 (10)
To test this condition for all −! ≤ ki < !, note there are three critical
points, two at the boundaries (ki = −! and ki → !) and one where the first
derivative equals zero:
φ(ki − !)− φ(ki + !) = 0 (11)
Since φ is a symmetric stable distribution, this is only true when |ki − !| =
|ki + !|, or ki = 0.
An invader ki = −! cannot invade when rc > 32 . To see why, we can use
equations (1) and (5) to derive an expected fitness for this individual:(
3
4
− 1
2
Φ(2!)
)
r −
(
1
4
Φ(2!)− 1
8
)
c (12)
This fitness is always less than the average fitness for individuals in a pop-
ulation of overconfident individuals (equation (6)) if:
r
c
>
3
2
(13)
Similarly, for an invader ki = 0 (unbiased) and we can use equations (1) and
(5) to derive an expected fitness when such an individual enters a population
of overconfident individuals (kj = !):(
1
2
− 1
2
Φ(!)
)
r −
(
1
4
Φ(!) +
1
2
Φ(2!)− 3
8
)
c (14)
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This fitness is less than the average fitness for individuals in a monomorphic
population of overconfident individuals when:
r
c
>
Φ(2!)− 12Φ(!)− 14
Φ(!)
(15)
Notice that the numerator in this expression ranges with ! such that it never
exceeds 12 while the denominator is never less than
1
2 , meaning overconfident
individuals are always safe if rc > 1.
For invaders where ki → !, we must find the limit using L’Hoˆpital’s rule.
Notice that:
lim
ki→!
Φ(ki + !)− Φ(2!)
Φ(ki − !)− 12
= lim
ki→!
φ(ki + !)
φ(ki − !) =
φ(2!)
φ(0)
(16)
Since φ is symmetric with mean 0, the denominator lies at the highest
point on the nonnegative function and the numerator lies below it if ! > 0.
Therefore, this value is less than one, and (9) implies that the condition
r
c >
3
2 is sufficient to ward off invasion for any type that approaches ki = !.
Next, consider an invader −3! ≤ ki ≤ −!. If this individual enters an
overconfident population (kj = !), the individual’s expected fitness is:(
1
2
Φ(ki + !) +
1
2
Φ(ki − !)
)
r −
(
1
4
Φ(2!) +
1
2
Φ(ki + !)− 1
4
)
c (17)
The fitness is increasing in ki if the first derivative is positive:(
1
2
φ(ki + !) +
1
2
φ(ki − !)
)
r −
(
1
2
φ(ki + !)
)
c > 0 (18)
which is true if
r
c
>
1
2
(
φ(ki + !)
φ(ki + !) +
1
2φ(ki − !)
)
(19)
Since all terms are positive, φ(ki + !)/(φ(ki + !) +
1
2φ(ki − !)) < 1 and the
right hand side must be less than 12 . This means that if
r
c >
1
2 then fitness is
maximized at ki = −!, which we know from above cannot invade if rc > 32 .
Therefore, no type in the range with −3! ≤ ki ≤ −! can invade under the
same conditions.
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Finally, consider an invader with ki ≤ −3!. If this individual enters an
overconfident population (kj = !), the individual’s expected fitness is:(
1
2
Φ(ki + !) +
1
2
Φ(ki − !)
)
r (20)
Since Φ is increasing in ki, fitness is maximized at ki = −3!, which we know
from above cannot invade if rc >
3
2 . Therefore, no type ki ≤ −3! can invade
under the same conditions.
2.2 Underconfident Populations (kj = −!)
Here we show that a population of individuals with kj = −! resists invasion
by all possible types (−∞ < ki <∞) as long as rc < 13 .
We start with types that have a confidence level less than the population
underconfidence level (ki < −!). The expected fitness for these individuals
is: (
1
2
Φ(ki + !) +
1
2
Φ(ki − !)
)
r (21)
Since Φ is increasing in ki, higher values of ki yield greater expected benefits,
and invaders always do better when ki = −! than when ki < −!. Therefore,
no individual with ki < −! can invade a population where kj = −!.
We can use the same reasoning to show that types with higher confidence
ki > −! are also incapable of invading. To do so, we need to check three
conditions: −! < ki ≤ !, ! ≤ ki ≤ 3!, and ki ≥ 3!.
When −! < k − i ≤ !, the expected fitness of an invader that enters an
underconfident population (kj = −!) is:(
1
4
Φ(ki + !) +
1
2
Φ(ki − !) + 1
8
)
r −
(
1
4
Φ(ki + !)− 1
8
)
c (22)
This fitness is less than the average population fitness when:
c
r
> 1 + 2
Φ(ki − !)− Φ(−2!)
Φ(ki + !)− 12
(23)
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Note that the right hand side is less than 3 if
Φ(ki − !)− Φ(−2!)− Φ(ki + !) + 1
2
< 0 (24)
To test this condition for all −! <k i ≤ !, note there are three critical
points, two at the boundaries (ki = ! and ki → −!) and one where the first
derivative equals zero:
φ(ki − !)− φ(ki + !) = 0 (25)
Since φ is a symmetric stable distribution, this is only true when |ki + !| =
|ki − !|, or ki = 0.
Substituting ki = ! in the right hand side of equation (23) yields the con-
dition cr > 3, which means more confident types cannot invade unless:
r
c
<
1
3
(26)
Substituting ki = 0 in the right hand side of equation (23) yields the con-
dition:
c
r
> 1 + 2
Φ(2!)− Φ(!)
Φ(!)− Φ(0) (27)
Notice that the right hand side here is less than 3 since the numerator is
always greater than the denominator. Thus, the condition rc <
1
3 remains
sufficient to ward off invaders.
For the point where ki → −!, we must find the limit using L’Hoˆpital’s rule.
Notice that:
lim
ki→−!
Φ(ki − !)− Φ(−2!)
Φ(ki + !)− 12
= lim
ki→−!
φ(ki − !)
φ(ki + !)
=
φ(−2!)
φ(0)
(28)
Since φ is symmetric with mean 0, the denominator lies at the highest
point on the nonnegative function and the numerator lies below it if ! < 0.
Therefore, this value is less than one, and (23) implies that the condition
r
c >
1
3 is sufficient to ward off invasion for any invader that approaches
ki = −!.
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Next, consider an invader of type ! ≤ ki ≤ 3!. If this individual enters an
underconfident population (kj = −!), the individual’s expected fitness is:(
1
4
Φ(2!) +
1
4
Φ(ki − !) + 1
4
)
r −
(
1
2
Φ(ki + !) +
1
4
Φ(ki − !)− 1
4
Φ(2!)− 1
2
)
c
(29)
The fitness is decreasing in ki if the first derivative is negative:
1
4
φ(ki − !)r −
(
1
2
φ(ki + !) +
1
4
φ(ki − !)
)
c < 0 (30)
which is true if
r
c
<
(
2φ(ki + !) + φ(ki − !)
φ(ki − !)
)
(31)
Since all terms are positive, the right hand side must be greater than 1. This
means that if rc < 1 then fitness is maximized at ki = !, which we know
from above cannot invade if rc <
1
3 . Therefore, no invader with ! ≤ ki ≤ 3!
can invade under the same conditions.
Finally, consider an individual of type ki ≥ 3!. If this individual enters an
underconfident population (kj = −!), the individual’s expected fitness is:(
1
2
Φ(2!) +
1
4
)
r −
(
1
2
Φ(ki + !) +
1
4
Φ(ki − !)− 1
4
Φ(2!)− 1
2
)
c (32)
Subtracting this from the underconfident (ki = −!) individual’s fitness
yields:
−1
2
(
(Φ(ki + !)− 1
2
) + (Φ(ki − !)− 1
2
) + (Φ(2!)− 1
2
)
)
c (33)
Which, by inspection, is always negative. Therefore, no type ki ≥ 3! can
invade under any conditions.
2.3 An Unbiased Population (kj = 0)
Here we show the conditions under which a population of individuals with
kj = 0 resists invasion by all possible types (−∞ < ki < ∞). In particular
12
the cost-benefit ratio must always fall within a range bounded by 13 <
r
c <
3
2 ,
and this range gets smaller as ! increases, disappearing as soon as ! > 1.34
if the capability distribution φ is normally distributed.
First, we use equations (1) and (5) to derive an expected fitness for an
individual of type ki when entering a population of unbiased individuals:(
1
2Φ(ki + !) +
1
2Φ(ki − !)
)
r if ki ≤ −2!(
1
2Φ(ki + !) +
1
2Φ(ki − !)
)
r
− (14Φ(ki + !) + 14Φ(!)− 14) c if −2! ≤ ki ≤ −!(
1
4Φ(ki + !) +
1
2Φ(ki − !) + 18
)
r
− (14Φ(ki + !) + 14Φ(!)− 14) c if −! ≤ ki ≤ 0(
1
2Φ(ki − !) + 14Φ(!) + 18
)
r
− (12Φ(ki + !) + 14Φ(ki − !) + 14Φ(!)− 12) c if 0 ≤ ki ≤ !(
1
4Φ(ki − !) + 14Φ(!) + 14
)
r
− (12Φ(ki + !) + 14Φ(ki − !) + 14Φ(!)− 12) c if ! ≤ ki ≤ 2!(
1
2Φ(!) +
1
4
)
r
− (12Φ(ki + !) + 12Φ(ki − !)− 12) c if 2! ≤ ki
(34)
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to ki yields:(
1
2φ(ki + !) +
1
2φ(ki − !)
)
r if ki ≤ −2!(
1
2φ(ki + !) +
1
2φ(ki − !)
)
r − 14φ(ki + !)c if −2! ≤ ki ≤ −!(
1
4φ(ki + !) +
1
2φ(ki − !)
)
r − 14φ(ki + !)c if −! ≤ ki ≤ 0
1
2φ(ki − !)r −
(
1
2φ(ki + !) +
1
4φ(ki − !)
)
c if 0 ≤ ki ≤ !
1
4φ(ki − !)r −
(
1
2φ(ki + !) +
1
4φ(ki − !)
)
c if ! ≤ ki ≤ 2!
− (12φ(ki + !) + 12φ(ki − !)) c if 2! ≤ ki
(35)
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We start with negative values of ki. The previous equation shows that
when ki ≤ −2!, fitness is always increasing in ki. When −2! ≤ ki ≤ −! it
is increasing as long as
r
c
>
1
2 + 2φ(ki−")φ(ki+")
(36)
and therefore ki = −2! is a local maximum if
r
c
<
1
2 + 2φ(3")φ(")
(37)
When −! ≤ ki ≤ 0 fitness is increasing as long as
r
c
>
1
1 + 2φ(ki−")φ(ki+")
(38)
and therefore ki = −! is a local maximum if
1
2 + 2φ(2")φ(0)
<
r
c
<
1
1 + 2φ(2")φ(0)
(39)
Finally, notice that since φ is a symmetric probability distribution with
maximum value at φ(0), the term φ(ki−")φ(ki+") is increasing in ki when −! ≤ ki ≤
0. This means the most binding constraint in this range occurs at ki = 0
where φ(ki−")φ(ki+") = 1 and this point can only be a local maximum if
r
c >
1
3 .
We now check positive values of ki. For types ki ≥ 2!, fitness is always
decreasing in ki. For ! ≤ ki ≤ 2! types it is decreasing as long as
r
c
< 2
(
φ(ki + !)
φ(ki − !) −
1
2
)
(40)
and therefore ki = 2! is a local maximum if
r
c
<
2φ(3!)
φ(!)
− 1 (41)
For 0 ≤ ki ≤ ! types fitness is decreasing as long as
r
c
<
φ(ki + !)
φ(ki − !) −
1
2
(42)
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and therefore ki = ! is a local maximum if
2φ(3!)
φ(!)
− 1 < r
c
<
φ(2!)
φ(0)
− 1
2
(43)
Finally, notice that since φ is a symmetric probability distribution with
maximum value at φ(0), the term φ(ki+")φ(ki−") is decreasing in ki when 0 ≤ ki ≤ !.
This means the most binding constraint in this range occurs at ki = 0 where
φ(ki+")
φ(ki−") = 1 and this point can only be a local maximum if
r
c <
3
2 .
To summarize, one requirement of equilibrium is that ki = 0 be a local
maximum, which can only be true if
1
3
<
r
c
<
3
2
(44)
Another requirement is that this local maximum be higher than the other
local maxima at ki = {−2!,−!, !, 2!}. To calculate these conditions, we
can use the fitness equation in (34) to compare fitness of unbiased types vs.
these other types. This yields the following conditions. Unbiased types do
better than type ki = −2! if
r
c
>
1
1
2 + 2
(
Φ(3")−Φ(0)
Φ(")−Φ(0)
) (45)
Unbiased types do better than type ki = −! if
r
c
>
1
1 + 2
(
Φ(2")−Φ(")
Φ(")−Φ(0)
) (46)
Unbiased types do better than type ki = ! if
r
c
<
Φ(2!)− Φ(!)
Φ(!)− Φ(0) +
1
2
(47)
Unbiased types do better than type ki = 2! if
r
c
<
2
3
(
Φ(3!)− Φ(0)
Φ(!)− Φ(0)
)
(48)
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Notice that all of these constraints become more restrictive as ! increases.
This is true because the derivative of the term Φ(3!)−Φ(0)Φ(!)−Φ(0) with respect to !
is (
Φ(!)− 12
)
φ(3!)− (Φ(3!)− 12)φ(!)(
Φ(!)− 12
)2 (49)
which is always negative since φ(!) > φ(3!) and Φ(3!) > Φ(!), and the
derivative of the term Φ(2!)−Φ(!)Φ(!)−Φ(0) with respect to ! is(
Φ(!)− 12
)
(φ(2!)− φ(!))− (Φ(2!)− Φ(!))φ(!)(
Φ(!)− 12
)2 (50)
which is always negative since φ(!) > φ(2!). By inspection, as both of these
terms become more negative, the constraints are more binding.
We calculated these constraints under the assumption that the symmetric
stable distribution Φ is standard normal. Consistent with the numerical
models below (see also Fig.1 in the main text), the results show that the
highest ! that permits an unbiased population to ward off invasion is ! ≈
1.34. This occurs at a cost-benefit ratio of rc ≈ 0.71 and at higher values of
! another type can always invade.
In other words, an unbiased population is only stable when the perception
error ! is sufficiently low, regardless of the costs of conflict or the benefits
of the resource.
2.4 Populations with a Mix of
Overconfident Types (kj = !) and
Underconfident Types (kj = −!)
Here we show the conditions under which a population with a mix of over-
confident (kj = !) and underconfident (kj = −!) individuals resists invasion
by all possible types (−∞ < ki <∞) as long as 13 < rc < 32 .
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At equilibrium, each type must obtain the same fitness:
pE(f |ki = !, kj = !) + (1− p)E(f |ki = !, kj = −!) =
pE(f |ki = −!, kj = !) + (1− p)E(f |ki = −!, kj = −!) (51)
We use equations (1) and (5) to derive the payoffs for each type against
itself and the opposing type, and use these to determine the equilibrium
proportion 0 < p < 1 of overconfident individuals and proportion 1− p of
underconfident individuals in the population. Setting the expected payoffs
equal to one another yields:(
1
2
r +
(
−Φ(2!) + 1
2
)
c
)
p+((
1
4
Φ(2!) +
3
8
)
r +
(
−1
4
Φ(2!) +
1
8
)
c
)
(1− p) =((
−1
2
Φ(2!) +
3
4
)
r +
(
−1
4
Φ(2!) +
1
8
)
c
)
p+
(
−1
2
Φ(2!) +
3
4
)
r(1−p)
(52)
Simplifying and solving for p, we find the equilibrium mixture is
p =
3r − c
r + 2c
(53)
and since 0 < p < 1, it must also be true that
1
3
<
r
c
<
3
2
(54)
Note that p is not conditional on the invading type ki, which will be helpful
in some cases in determining how fitness changes with respect to ki.
For a population of types −! and !, the fitness of an invader is the fitness
against each type multiplied by the fraction of each type in the population:
pE(f |kj = !) + (1− p)E(f |kj = −!). Using equations (1) and (5) to derive
the payoff of the invader against each type, we can see that when ki ≥ 3!,
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the invader’s fitness is(
1
2
r +
(
−1
2
Φ(ki + !)− 1
2
Φ(ki − !)− 1
2
Φ(2!) +
3
4
)
c
)
p+((
1
2
Φ(2!) +
1
4
)
r+(
−1
2
Φ(ki + !)− 1
2
Φ(ki − !) + 1
2
Φ(2!) +
1
4
)
c
)
(1− p) (55)
This equation is always decreasing in ki since every term is negative in
which ki is involved as a positive element of the cumulative function Φ.
When ! ≤ ki ≤ 3!, the payoff to the invader is(
1
2
r +
(
−1
2
Φ(ki + !)− 1
2
Φ(ki − !)− 1
2
Φ(2!) +
3
4
)
c
)
p+((
1
4
Φ(2!) +
1
4
Φ(ki − !) + 1
4
)
r+(
−1
2
Φ(ki + !)− 1
4
Φ(ki − !) + 1
4
Φ(2!) +
1
4
)
c
)
(1− p). (56)
Taking the first derivative with respect to ki and simplifying, we see that
this payoff is decreasing when
φ(ki + !) (r(1− p)− 2c)− φ(ki − !)c(1− p) < 0 (57)
which is always true if r < 2c (or rc < 2). Under these conditions, no ki > !
can invade since the payoff is always decreasing as ki increases.
When ki ≤ −3!, the payoff to the invader is
1
2
(Φ(ki + !) + Φ(ki − !)) r (58)
which is always increasing in ki.
Meanwhile, when −3! ≤ ki ≤ −!, the payoff to the invader is
1
2
(Φ(ki + !) + Φ(ki − !)) r − 1
4
(Φ(2!) + Φ(ki + !)− 1) cp (59)
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This payoff is increasing in ki if the first derivative of this equation is posi-
tive:
1
2
(φ(ki + ") + φ(ki − ")) r − 1
4
(φ(ki + ")) cp > 0 (60)
and substituting the equilibrium value of p from equation (53), we get:
φ(ki + ")(2r
2 + cr + c2) + φ(ki − ")(3r − c) > 0 (61)
Notice that this expression is always positive as long as 3r − c > 0 (or
r
c >
1
3).
Finally, we check the interior to see what conditions must be met to prevent
invaders of intermediate types from invading. The payoff to a type −" ≤
ki ≤ " is((
1
2
Φ(ki − ") + 1
4
)
r +
(
−1
2
Φ(ki + ")− 1
4
Φ(ki − ")− 1
2
Φ(2") +
5
8
)
c
)
p+((
1
4
Φ(ki + ") +
1
2
Φ(ki − ") + 1
8
)
r +
(
−1
4
Φ(ki + ") +
1
8
)
c
)
(1−p)
(62)
The first derivative of this expression is((
1
2
φ(ki − ")
)
r +
(
−1
2
φ(ki + ")− 1
4
φ(ki − ")
)
c
)
p+((
1
4
φ(ki + ") +
1
2
φ(ki − ")
)
r +
(
−1
4
φ(ki + ")
)
c
)
(1− p) (63)
Substituting in the equilibrium value of p from equation (53), this expression
simplifies to
2r2 + cr + c2
4r + 8c
(φ(ki − ")− φ(ki + ")) (64)
Since φ is a symmetric probability distribution with maximum value at
φ(0), the term φ(ki − ")− φ(ki + ") is negative when −" ≤ ki < 0, 0 when
ki = 0, and positive when 0 < ki ≤ ". This means that the maximum
payoffs in this range are achieved at ki = −" and ki = " and therefore no
interior type (including unbiased types) can invade.
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2.5 Populations with a Mix of Very
Underconfident Types (kj = −2!) and
Unbiased Types (kj = 0)
Here we show the conditions under which a population with a mix of un-
biased (kj = 0) and very underconfident (kj = −2!) individuals resists
invasion by all possible types (−∞ < ki < ∞) if ! is sufficiently small and
r
c <
1
3 .
At equilibrium, each type must obtain the same fitness:
pE(f |ki = −2!, kj = 0) + (1− p)E(f |ki = −2!, kj = −2!) =
pE(f |ki = 0, kj = 0) + (1− p)E(f |ki = 0, kj = −2!) (65)
We use equations (1) and (5) to derive the payoffs for each type against
itself and the opposing type, and use these to determine the equilibrium
proportion 0 < p < 1 of overconfident individuals and proportion 1− p of
underconfident individuals in the population. Setting the expected payoffs
equal to one another yields:(
1− 1
2
Φ(3!) +
1
2
Φ(!)
)
rp+
(
1− 1
2
Φ(3!) +
1
2
Φ(!)
)
r(1− p) =((
−1
4
Φ(!) +
5
8
)
r −
(
1
2
Φ(!)− 1
4
)
c
)
p+
1
2
r(1− p) (66)
Simplifying and solving for p, we find the equilibrium mixture is
p =
2r
r + 2c
(
1 +
Φ(3!)− 12
Φ(!)− 12
)
(67)
Notice that p is always positive as long as ! > 0. And since 0 < p < 1, it
must also be true that for this equilibrium to exist
r
c
<
2
1 + 2
Φ(3!)− 12
Φ(!)− 12
(68)
When !→∞, the c.d.f. Φ→ 1, and this constraint simplifies to rc < 23 . As
! decreases, the constraint becomes more binding. To determine the value
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when !→ 0, we must find the limit using L’Hoˆpital’s rule:
lim
!→0
Φ(3!)− 12
Φ(!)− 12
= lim
!→0
3φ(3!)
φ(!)
= 3 (69)
and the constraint for p < 1 simplifies to rc <
2
7 .
For a population of types 0 and −2!, the fitness of an invader is the fitness
against each type multiplied by the fraction of each type in the population:
pE(f |kj = 0)+(1−p)E(f |kj = −2!). Using equations (1) and (5) to derive
the payoff of the invader against each type, we can see that when ki ≥ 4!,
the invader’s fitness is((
1
2
Φ(2!) +
1
4
)
r +
(
−1
2
Φ(ki + !)− 1
2
Φ(ki − !) + 1
2
)
c
)
p((
1
2
Φ(3!) +
1
2
Φ(!)
)
r+(
−1
2
Φ(ki + !)− 1
2
Φ(ki − !) + 1
2
Φ(3!) +
1
2
Φ(!)
)
c
)
(1− p). (70)
This equation is always decreasing in ki since every term is negative in
which ki is involved as a positive element of the cumulative function Φ.
When 2! ≤ ki ≤ 4!, the payoff to the invader is((
1
2
Φ(!) +
1
4
)
r +
(
−1
2
Φ(ki + !)− 1
2
Φ(ki − !) + 1
2
)
c
)
p+((
1
4
Φ(ki − !) + 1
4
Φ(3!) +
1
2
Φ(!)
)
r+(
−1
2
Φ(ki + !)− 1
4
Φ(ki − !) + 1
4
Φ(3!) +
1
2
Φ(!)
)
c
)
(1− p) (71)
Taking the first derivative with respect to ki and simplifying, we see that
this payoff is always decreasing because all terms are negative:
−3r2 −
(
2
Φ(3!)− 12
Φ(!)− 12
+ 1
)
rc− 2c2 − 2φ(ki + !)
φ(ki − !) (r + c) < 0 (72)
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When ! ≤ ki ≤ 2!, the payoff to the invader is((
1
4
Φ(ki − !) + 1
4
Φ(!) +
1
4
)
r+(
−1
2
Φ(ki + !)− 1
4
Φ(ki − !)− 1
4
Φ(!) +
1
2
)
c
)
p+((
1
4
Φ(ki + !) +
1
2
Φ(ki − !) + 1
4
Φ(!)
)
r+(
−1
4
Φ(ki + !) +
1
4
Φ(!)
)
c
)
(1 − p) (73)
Taking the first derivative with respect to ki and simplifying, we see that
this payoff is always decreasing because both terms are negative:
−2(Φ(3!)−
1
2) (φ(ki + !) + φ(ki − !))
Φ(!)− 12
r(r + c)− Φ(ki + !)(r2 + rc+ 2c2) < 0
(74)
When 0 ≤ ki ≤ !, the payoff to the invader is((
1
2
Φ(ki − !) + 1
4
Φ(!) +
1
8
)
r+(
−1
2
Φ(ki + !)− 1
4
Φ(ki − !)− 1
4
Φ(!) +
1
2
)
c
)
p+((
1
4
Φ(ki + !) +
1
2
Φ(ki − !) + 1
4
Φ(!)
)
r+(
−1
4
Φ(ki + !) +
1
4
Φ(!)
)
c
)
(1 − p) (75)
Taking the first derivative with respect to ki and simplifying, we see that
this payoff is decreasing when
2 (φ(ki + !) + φ(ki − !))
(
r − Φ(3!)−
1
2
Φ(!)− 12
c
)
r−
Φ(ki + !)
(
3 + 2
Φ(3!)− 12
Φ(!)− 12
)
r2 + rc + c2) < 0 (76)
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Notice that the second term is always negative, while the first term is neg-
ative if r <
Φ(3!)− 12
Φ(!)− 12
c. Since
Φ(3!)− 12
Φ(!)− 12
ranges from 3 → 1 as ! goes from 0 to
∞, this means that fitness is always decreasing in ki if rc < 1.
Therefore, under the stricter constraint that rc <
2
3 to ensure that p < 1 for
at least some values of !, fitness is decreasing for all invaders with positive
ki.
We now turn to invaders with values of ki ≤ −2!. Their payoff is
1
2
(Φ(ki + !) + Φ(ki − !)) rp+ 1
2
(Φ(ki + !) + Φ(ki − !)) r(1− p) (77)
which is always increasing in ki.
Finally, we check the interior between ki = −2! and ki = 0 to see what
conditions must be met to prevent invaders of intermediate types from
invading. When −2! ≤ ki ≤ −!, the payoff to the invader is(
1
2
(Φ(ki + !) + Φ(ki − !)) r +
(
−1
4
Φ(ki + !)− 1
4
Φ(!) +
1
4
)
c
)
p+
1
2
(Φ(ki + !) + Φ(ki − !)) r(1 − p) (78)
If we subtract this payoff from the population payoff and rearrange, we find
that this value is positive (invaders can invade) only when
r
c
<
(
1
1 + Φ(ki+!)−Φ(−!)Φ(ki+!)−Φ(−3!)
)(
Φ(3!)− 12
Φ(!)− 12
)
− 2 (79)
Notice that in this range, Φ(ki + !)−Φ(−!) > Φ(ki − !)− φ(−3!) if ! > 0,
and the difference in these differences increases in ki since Φ is convex in
this range. Therefore, the constraint is decreasing in ki and becomes most
binding when ki = −!. The payoff to a type −! ≤ ki ≤ 0 is((
1
4
Φ(ki + !) +
1
2
Φ(ki − !) + 1
8
)
r +
(
−1
4
Φ(ki + !)− 1
4
Φ(!) +
1
4
)
c
)
p+
1
2
(Φ(ki + !) + Φ(ki − !)) r(1 − p) (80)
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If we subtract this payoff from the population payoff and rearrange, we find
that this value is positive (invaders can invade) only when
r
c
<
1
1
1+
Φ(−!)−Φ(ki−!)
Φ(!)−Φ(ki+!)
(
Φ(3!)− 12
Φ(!)− 12
)
− 1
− 1 (81)
Notice that in this range, Φ(−!) − Φ(ki − !) is increasing more quickly
as ki increases because this difference lies on the concave part of Φ, while
Φ(!)−Φ(ki+ !) is increasing more slowly because this difference lies on the
convex part of Φ. Therefore the constraint is increasing in ki and, as above,
the constraint becomes most binding when ki = −!.
For the last step, we check the conditions under which the population can
resist invasion by a type ki = −!. The fitness of this type against the
population is((
3
4
− 1
2
Φ(2!)
)
r +
(
1
8
− 1
4
Φ(!)
)
c
)
p+
(
3
4
− 1
2
Φ(2!)
)
r(1− p)
(82)
Subtracting this payoff from the population payoff yields an equation which
must be positive to sustain equilibrium. Rearranging this equation yields
the following constraint:
r
c
<
1
1− Φ(2!)− 12Φ(3!)+Φ(!)−1
− 2 (83)
Notice that this constraint approaches rc < 0 as !→ 0 since
lim
!→0
Φ(2!)− 12
Φ(3!) + Φ(!)− 1 = lim!→0
2φ(2!)
3φ(3!) + φ(!)
=
2φ(0)
3φ(0) + φ(0)
=
1
2
(84)
Similarly, the constraint approaches rc < 0 as ! → ∞ since Φ(∞) = 1.
For finite positive values, we can see that the constraint is positive. This
requires
Φ(2!)− 12
Φ(3!)+Φ(!)−1 >
1
2 which can also be written as Φ(2!) >
Φ(3!)+Φ(!)
2 ,
and this inequality is implied by concavity of Φ. Therefore, a cost-benefit
ratio always exists that will permit this equilibrium, but the constraint is
least restrictive for moderate levels of perception error.
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We studied equation (83) numerically assuming Φ was a cumulative normal
distribution and verified that it is positive but approaches zero at both high
and low values of !. We also found that the maximum constraint is rc <
1
3
which occurs at approximately ! ≈ 0.86. These results match the equilibria
shown in Fig.1 of the main text.
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3 Numerical Extensions of the Model
The binomial error structure used in the analytical model of the previous
sections was deliberately simple to make tractable closed-form characteri-
zations of the conditional probabilities. Here we allow the distribution of
the perception error to be either binomial or normal with mean 0 and stan-
dard deviation !. We assume that a is distributed standard normal and we
permit k to take on any real value.
To produce numerical results from this model, we used the code shown in
the next section, written in the R language. This code allows us to find
equilibria via two methods in order to cross-check results and verify the
analytical solutions.
In the “dynamic” method, we randomly match each individual in a pop-
ulation of constant size with another individual to play one iteration of
the game (a “generation”). We then keep each individual with a prob-
ability of survival that is proportional to their game payoff. Individuals
that are removed are replaced by surviving types with a probability that
is proportional to their prevalence in the surviving population. At each
generation we also randomly choose a fraction of the population to replace
with a mutant type drawn from the set of all possible types. A dynamic
plot (see Supplementary Fig.1) shows the distribution of surviving types in
the population at fixed intervals over the course of a pre-specified number
of generations.
In the “best reply” method, we find an iterated best reply equilibrium by
starting with a population with a pre-specified set of types. The initial
population can either be monomorphic or a mix of two types. We then
identify the invading type that earns the highest expected payoff against
the population. If this new type earns a lower payoff than the population
average, then the population is at an equilibrium. Otherwise if the invading
type beats all types in pairwise competition, then we replace the population
with the invading type. If the invading type does not beat all types but
nevertheless beats the population average then we replace the type that
does more poorly with the invading type. We repeat this procedure until
no invader can invade or until a previously-tested population is repeated.
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Supplementary Figure 1: Sample runs of the dynamic method for r = 2, c = 1,
! = 1, where we start with a population of 1000 in which all individuals are
unbiased (k = 0). The left panel shows results for the binomial model, and
the right panel shows results for the normal model. The size of each circle is
proportional to number of that type in the population at that generation. Colors
are assigned randomly to each type. The X indicates the equilibrium predicted
by analytic results (for the binomial model) and the best reply method (for both
the binomial and normal models).
Both methods generate the same results, but we specifically use the best-
reply method to construct the figures shown in the main text.
We systematically explored the parameter space defined by 0 < !< 5,
0 < r < 5, and 0 < c < 5 for populations of size 1000, drawing 10,000
sets of values in these ranges from a uniform distribution. These values
remained fixed for each simulation. The results of these simulations are
shown in Fig.1 in the main text, and they indicate that both methods
reproduce the analytical results when there is a binomial perception error,
and that the equilibrium value k∗ > 0 for all rc > 0.7 when there is any
positive normal perception error (regardless of its magnitude).
In general, both methods produce the same equilibria, subject to the num-
ber of generations used in the dynamic method and the accuracy of the
integral of the normal distribution of a used to calculate the expected value
in the best reply method (see Supplementary Fig. 1 for an example). We
manually checked discrepancies arising from parameter values near bound-
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ary thresholds, or the dynamic simulation not running long enough, by
examining the set of invader payoffs for all types to determine which of the
proposed equilibria were valid.
Under the assumption of a binomial perception error, the starting popula-
tion sometimes determines the equilibrium that can be reached. For exam-
ple, to find equilibria that contain at least one unbiased type (k = 0), we
must start with a population at or near kj = 0. All parameter combinations
that yield an unbiased type as part of one equilibrium also yield a second
equilibrium that contains no unbiased types (see Fig.1 of the main text).
Specifically, when a monomorphic unbiased population is an equilibrium,
so is a mixed population of underconfident (k = −!) and overconfident
(k = !) individuals. And when a mix of unbiased and very underconfident
(k = −2!) individuals is an equilibrium, so is a monorphic population of
underconfident individuals (k = −!). To find these second equilibria, we
typically start with a population of two extreme values (e.g. k = {−10, 10}).
3.1 R Code for the Numerical Models
## FUNCTION TO FIND SPECIFIC PAYOFFS WHEN EACH INDIVIDUAL
## PLAYS ONE OTHER INDIVIDUAL IN THE POPULATION
simkvec<-function(k,error) {
# randomly match each i with a j
pairs<-matrix(sample(k),ncol=2) # generate random pairs
k_i<-c(pairs[,1],pairs[,2]) # create vector of types for individual i
k_j<-c(pairs[,2],pairs[,1]) # create vector of types for individual j
# errors and advantages
a<-rnorm(n) # endowment advantage of i over j
if(error=="normal") {
e_i<-rnorm(n,0,e) # errors in i perception of j
e_j<-rnorm(n,0,e) # errors in j perception of i
} else {
if(error=="binomial") {
e_i<-sample(c(e,-e),n,replace=T) # errors in i perception of j
e_j<-sample(c(e,-e),n,replace=T) # errors in j perception of i
} else {
return("need to specify binomial or normal error")
}
}
# probabilities of claiming and winning
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i_claims <- ( a + e_i + k_i) > 0 # determine if i makes a claim
j_claims <- (-a + e_j + k_j) > 0 # determine if j makes a claim
i_wins <- a > 0 # determine if i beats j
# payoffs
# r if i fights and j does not fight,
# r-c if j fights and i wins, and
# -c if j fights and i loses,
# 0 otherwise
payoffs_i <- i_claims * ifelse(j_claims, i_wins*r - c, r)
# return payoffs
return(cbind(k_i, payoffs_i))
}
## FUNCTION TO APPROXIMATE E(PAYOFF) TO k_i AGAINST A SPECIFIC k_j
simkpair<-function(k,error) {
# advantage distribution
a <- (-5*nn):(5*nn)/nn # advantage to i
pr_a <- dnorm(a) # probability density for a
pr_a <- pr_a / sum(pr_a) # normalize density to create probabilities
# probabilities of claiming and winning
if(error=="normal") {
i_claims <- pnorm( a + k[1], sd=e) # probability i makes a claim
j_claims <- pnorm(-a + k[2], sd=e) # probability j makes a claim
} else if(error=="binomial") {
i_claims <- 0.5*( a + k[1] + e > 0) + 0.5*( a + k[1] - e > 0) # probability i makes a claim
j_claims <- 0.5*(-a + k[2] + e > 0) + 0.5*(-a + k[2] - e > 0) # probability j makes a claim
} else {
return("need to specify binomial or normal error")
}
i_wins <- a > 0 # determine if i beats j
i_ties <- which(a == 0) # determine when i ties j
# payoffs
# r if i fights and j does not fight,
# r-c if j fights and i wins, and
# -c if j fights and i loses,
# 0 otherwise
payoffs_i <- i_claims * (j_claims * (i_wins * r - c) + (1 - j_claims) * r)
# if i and j tie, there is a 0.5 chance i wins
payoffs_i[i_ties] <- i_claims[i_ties] *
(j_claims[i_ties] * (0.5 * r - c) + (1 - j_claims[i_ties]) * r)
# return payoffs
return(sum(payoffs_i * pr_a ))
}
## FUNCTION TO GET PAYOFFS FOR AN INVADER AND 2 EXISTING TYPES IN A POPULATION
# get payoffs for an invader and 2 types in a population
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simk3<-function(x,y,error) {
# if type 1 and 2 are the same, then do not calculate mixture
if(y[1] == y[2]) {
p_pop<-simkpair(c(y[1],y[1]),error=error) # type 1 payoff vs. self
mix<-1 # arbitrarily assign type 1 to be the winning type
# otherwise, calculate mixture
} else {
# calculate payoffs when each population type plays self and other
p11<-simkpair(c(y[1],y[1]),error=error) # type 1 payoff vs. type 1
p12<-simkpair(c(y[1],y[2]),error=error) # type 1 payoff vs. type 2
p21<-simkpair(c(y[2],y[1]),error=error) # type 2 payoff vs. type 1
p22<-simkpair(c(y[2],y[2]),error=error) # type 2 payoff vs. type 2
# calculate proportion of type 1 in equilibrium mixture
if(p11>=p21&p12>=p22) {
mix<-1
} else {
if(p21>p11&p22>p12) {
mix<-0
} else {
mix<-(p22-p12)/(p11-p12-p21+p22)
}
}
# payoff of population
p_pop<-mix*p11+(1-mix)*p12
}
# payoff of each invader type vs. population
p_inv<-rep(NA,length(x))
for(i in 1:length(x)) {
p_inv[i]<- mix * simkpair(c(x[i],y[1]),error=error) +
(1-mix) * simkpair(c(x[i],y[2]),error=error)
}
# return mixture and invader and population payoffs
return(cbind(mix,p_inv,p_pop))
}
## FUNCTION USED BY BEST REPLY FUNCTION
simk3optimize <- function(x,y,error=error) simk3(x,y,error=error)[2]
## FUNCTION TO IDENTIFY EQUILIBRIA BASED ON ITERATED BEST REPLY
bestreply<-function(khats,error) {
khatslist<-paste(khats,collapse=" ") # initialize poulation list
continue<-TRUE # initialize continuation variable
# start loop to search for best replies
while(continue) {
print(khats)
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# find maxima in various regions less than, greater than, and near 0
# we do this because the payoff curve is sometimes kinked for the binomial case
# at -2e, -e, 0, e, and 2e
o1 <- optimize(simk3optimize, c(-5,-3*e/2), y=khats, maximum = T, error=error)
o2 <- optimize(simk3optimize, c(-3*e/2,-e/2), y=khats, maximum = T, error=error)
o3 <- optimize(simk3optimize, c(-e/2,e/2), y=khats, maximum = T, error=error)
o4 <- optimize(simk3optimize, c(e/2,3*e/2), y=khats, maximum = T, error=error)
o5 <- optimize(simk3optimize, c(3*e/2,5), y=khats, maximum = T, error=error)
objectives<-c(o1$objective,o2$objective,o3$objective,o4$objective,o5$objective)
maxima<-c(o1$maximum,o2$maximum,o3$maximum,o4$maximum,o5$maximum)
# choose invader with highest maximum
invader<-maxima[which.max(objectives)]
# evaluate best invader vs. population
s<-simk3(invader,y=khats,error=error)
# if invader does better than population....
if(s[2]>=s[3]) {
# check current type against a mix of invader and other current type
s1<-simk3(khats[1],y=c(khats[2],invader),error=error)
s2<-simk3(khats[2],y=c(khats[1],invader),error=error)
# if invader dominates both populations, create whole pop from invaders
if(s1[1]==0&s2[1]==0) {
khats<-c(invader,invader)
} else {
# replace type that does worst against invader
if(s1[2]>=s2[2]) khats<-sort(c(khats[1],invader))
if(s2[2]>s1[2]) khats<-sort(c(khats[2],invader))
}
}
# add this population to the list (round to 3 digits)
khatslist<-c(khatslist,paste(round(khats,3),collapse=" "))
# if this population was already evaluated, stop searching
if(khatslist[length(khatslist)]%in%khatslist[1:(length(khatslist)-1)]) continue<-FALSE
}
# print approximate solution
return(khats)
}
## STEP 1: SET PARAMETERS FOR SIMULATION
n<-1000 # number of individuals in population
c<-1 # cost of fighting
r<-2 # reward to winning
e<-1 # size of error perception
d<-0.5 # approx. fraction of population that dies each time
g<-5000 # number of generations
m<-0.001 # mutation rate
gg<-50 # how many generations to skip between plot points
error<-"binomial" # choose binomial or normal perception error
start<-"unbiased" # choose starting population
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# initial distribution of possible k thresholds in population
# NOTE: IF THERE ARE TWO EQUILIBRIA, STARTING VALUES WILL DETERMINE
# WHICH ONE HAPPENS.
if(start=="unbiased") {
# start with unbiased population
k<-rep(0,n)
} else {
# otherwise start with extreme mixed population
k<-c(rep(-10,round(n/2)),rep(10,n-round(n/2)))
}
# initialize plot
par(mai=c(1,1.2,0.1,0.1))
colors<-rainbow(6001)[sample(6001)] # randomly assign color to each type
plot(c(-1000,g*2),c(0,0),xlim=c(0,g),ylim=c(-3,3),type="l",lty="dotted",
xlab="Generations",font.lab=2,cex.lab=1.5,cex.axis=1.5,lwd=3,
ylab="Type (k)\nUnderconfident Overconfident")
# loop through each generation
for(i in 1:g) {
# get payoffs
kp<-simkvec(k,error=error)
k<-kp[,1]
p<-kp[,2]
# plot payoffs compared to k, color fixed for each k
if(i%%gg==0) {
tab<-table(k)
points(rep(i,length(tab)),names(tab),pch=1,cex=5*sqrt(tab/n),
col=colors[(as.numeric(names(tab))+3)*1000+1])
}
# normalize payoffs to create probability of remaining in population
# proportional to payoff
p<-(p-min(p))/(max(p)-min(p))
p<-1-2*(1-p)*d
# decide which individuals to remove from population
dead<-which(p<runif(n,0,1))
# replace dead strategies with live strategies
if(length(dead)>0) k[dead]<-sample(k[-dead],length(dead),replace=T)
# create mutant types, sampling from whole space
mutant<-sample(n,round(n*m))
k[mutant]<-round(runif(1,-3,3),3)
}
## STEP 2: ADD ITERATED BEST REPLY EQUILIBRIA
nn<-1000 # number of samples of normal distribution (higher = slower, more accurate)
# search near unbiased populations
b1<-bestreply(c(0,0),error=error)
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# search again far from unbiased populations
b2<-bestreply(c(-10,10),error=error)
# print approximate equilibria (note, sometimes they will be different,
# but if they are nearby they are probably technically the same one)
print(b1)
print(b2)
# add best reply equilibrium points to plot
points(c(g,g),b1,pch=4,cex=5,col="black")
points(c(g,g),b2,pch=4,cex=5,col="black")
3.2 Interactions Between Three Individuals
One potential concern about the model is that it might generate results
that are idiosyncratic to interactions between two individuals, important
and common as these are in nature. Although it is beyond the scope of
this article to generalize the results to n individuals, we have adapted the
numerical simulation to allow for interactions between three individuals.
As in the numerical model with two individuals, we set the distribution
of the perception error to be normal with mean 0 and standard deviation
!. We also assume that the advantage a is distributed standard normal.
Individuals only choose to claim a resource if they think they could win a
conflict over it, and conflict only occurs if at least two of the three individ-
uals claim the resource. All individuals in a conflict pay a cost c and the
winner of the conflict must beat all other claimants, which they must fight
in sequence, one after the other. Furthermore, when one individual claims
a resource and the other two do not, then the resource goes to the claimant.
If none of the three individuals claims the resource, then all payoffs are 0.
We systematically explored the parameter space defined by 0 < !< 5,
0 < r < 5, and 0 < c < 5 for populations of size 1000, drawing 10,000 sets
of values in these ranges from a uniform distribution. Supplementary Fig.
2 reveals that the fundamental relationship between equilibrium confidence
and the benefit-cost ratio remains intact. The main difference is that higher
perception errors are required to reach extreme values of k∗ than in the two
individual case. Otherwise, the threshold at which overconfidence becomes
sustainable (approximately rc > 0.7) appears to be similar, there are no
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Supplementary Figure 2: Equilibrium levels of confidence (k∗) for varying benefit-
cost ratios rc and varying degrees of uncertainty (!) about the capabilities of
competitors in the model extension with three individuals competing for a re-
source. Notice the similarity to Figure 1 in the main text, where overconfidence
is sustainable at approximately rc > 0.7.
mixed equilibria, and the unbiased equilibrium is still rare. To produce
numerical results from the model with three individuals, we altered the
simkvec function as follows:
simkvec<-function(k) {
# randomly match each i, j, h
trios<-matrix(sample(k),ncol=3) # generate random trios
k_i<-trios[,1]
k_j<-trios[,2]
k_h<-trios[,3]
# errors and advantages
theta_i<-rnorm(n/3,0,sqrt(2)/2) # capability of i
theta_j<-rnorm(n/3,0,sqrt(2)/2) # capability of j
theta_h<-rnorm(n/3,0,sqrt(2)/2) # capability of h
a_ij<-theta_i-theta_h # endowment advantage of i over j
a_ih<-theta_i-theta_h # endowment advantage of i over h
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a_jh<-theta_j-theta_h # endowment advantage of j over h
e_ij<-rnorm(n/3,0,e) # errors in i perception of j
e_ih<-rnorm(n/3,0,e) # errors in i perception of h
e_ji<-rnorm(n/3,0,e) # errors in j perception of i
e_jh<-rnorm(n/3,0,e) # errors in j perception of h
e_hi<-rnorm(n/3,0,e) # errors in h perception of i
e_hj<-rnorm(n/3,0,e) # errors in h perception of j
# determine if i makes a claim
i_claims <- (( a_ij + e_ij + k_i) > 0) & (( a_ih + e_ih + k_i) > 0)
# determine if i makes a claim
j_claims <- (( -a_ij + e_ji + k_j) > 0) & (( a_jh + e_jh + k_j) > 0)
# determine if i makes a claim
h_claims <- (( -a_ih + e_hi + k_h) > 0) & (( -a_jh + e_hj + k_j) > 0)
# probabilities of winning
i_wins <- (a_ij > 0) & (a_ih > 0) # determine if i beats j and h
j_wins <- (-a_ij > 0) & (a_jh > 0) # determine if j beats i and h
h_wins <- (-a_ih > 0) & (-a_jh > 0) # determine if h beats i and j
# payoffs
# r if one individual claims and others do not claim,
# r-c if two or more individuals fight and a individual wins, and
# -c if two or more individuals fight and a individual loses,
# 0 otherwise
payoffs_i <- i_claims * ifelse(j_claims|h_claims, i_wins*r - c, r)
payoffs_j <- j_claims * ifelse(i_claims|h_claims, j_wins*r - c, r)
payoffs_h <- h_claims * ifelse(i_claims|j_claims, h_wins*r - c, r)
# return payoffs
return(cbind(c(k_i,k_j,k_h),c(payoffs_i,payoffs_j,payoffs_h)))
}
3.3 Asymmetric Costs
Another concern about the model is that it might generate results that are
idiosyncratic to the assumption that costs are the same for losers as for
winners. In response, we have adapted the numerical simulation to allow
the loser’s costs to be higher than the winner’s costs.
As in the numerical model with symmetric costs, we set the distribution
of the perception error to be normal with mean 0 and standard deviation
!. We also assume that the advantage a is distributed standard normal.
Individuals that lose a conflict incur a cost c as usual, but winners incur a
smaller cost 0 < cwin < c.
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Supplementary Figure 3: Equilibrium levels of confidence (k∗) for varying benefit-
cost ratios rc and varying degrees of uncertainty (!) about the capabilities of
competitors in the model extension in which winners of conflicts incur a fraction
of the cost of losers when competing for a resource. Notice the similarity to Figure
1 in the main text, except here overconfidence is sustainable for approximately
r
c > 0.45 (where c is the loser’s cost) when cwin/c = 0.2 and approximately
r
c > 0.6 when cwin/c = 0.8.
We systematically explored the parameter space defined by 0 < !< 5,
0 < r < 5, and 0 < c < 5 for populations of size 1000, drawing 10,000 sets
of values in these ranges from a uniform distribution. We evaluated two
scenarios, one in which cwin/c = 0.2 and another in which cwin/c = 0.8, to
determine whether asymmetric costs fundamentally altered the relationship
between the benefit/cost ratio and equilibrium overconfidence.
Supplementary Fig. 3 shows that the fundamental relationship between
equilibrium confidence and the benefit-cost ratio remains intact, there are
no mixed equilibria, and the unbiased equilibrium is still rare. The main
difference is that overconfidence becomes an equilibrium at a lower thresh-
old as the cost to winners relative to losers (cwin/c) decreases. In other
words, reducing costs incurred by winners makes it even more likely that
overconfidence would evolve and be maintained.
To produce numerical results from the model with asymmetric costs, we
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altered the simkpair function as follows:
simkpair<-function(k,error) {
# advantage distribution
a <- (-5*nn):(5*nn)/nn # advantage to i
pr_a <- dnorm(a) # probability density for a
pr_a <- pr_a / sum(pr_a) # normalize density to create probabilities
# probabilities of claiming and winning
if(error=="normal") {
i_claims <- pnorm( a + k[1], sd=e) # probability i makes a claim
j_claims <- pnorm(-a + k[2], sd=e) # probability j makes a claim
} else if(error=="binomial") {
i_claims <- 0.5*( a + k[1] + e > 0) + 0.5*( a + k[1] - e > 0) # probability i makes a claim
j_claims <- 0.5*(-a + k[2] + e > 0) + 0.5*(-a + k[2] - e > 0) # probability j makes a claim
} else {
return("need to specify binomial or normal error")
}
i_wins <- a > 0 # determine if i beats j
i_ties <- which(a == 0) # determine when i ties j
# payoffs
# r if i fights and j does not fight,
# r-c if j fights and i wins, and
# -c if j fights and i loses,
# 0 otherwise
payoffs_i <- i_claims * (j_claims * ifelse(i_wins, r - c_win, - c) + (1 - j_claims) * r)
# if i and j tie, there is a 0.5 chance i wins
payoffs_i[i_ties] <- i_claims[i_ties] *
j_claims[i_ties] * (0.5 * (r - c_win) + 0.5 * (- c) + (1 - j_claims[i_ties]) * r)
# return payoffs
return(sum(payoffs_i * pr_a ))
}
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4 The Hawk-Dove Game is a Special Case
The well-known Hawk-Dove game is a special case of the model we present
here. Under the assumption that only two behavioural types are possi-
ble, ki = ∞ (Hawk) and ki = −∞ (Dove), the following table shows the
expected fitness E(f) in our model for each pairing of outcomes:
Supplementary Table 1: Expected fitness in the special case where k ∈ {∞,−∞}
as in the Hawk-Dove game
Hawk Dove
kj =∞ kj = −∞
Hawk ki =∞ r/2− c,r/2− c r,0
Dove ki = −∞ 0,r 0,0
When r > 2c, this is not, strictly speaking, a Hawk-Dove game since a
monomorphic population of Hawks (kj = ∞) is the unique equilibrium if
we only permit Doves as the alternative type. However, when r < 2c,
a polymorphic population of Hawks (kj = ∞) and Doves (kj = −∞) is
possible.
Our model shows that overconfident individuals (ki = !) can invade a pop-
ulation of Hawks. The expected fitness of the invading individual is
r/2−
(
3
4
− Φ(2!)
)
c (85)
which is clearly always greater than the fitness of a Hawk in a population
full of Hawks (shown in the table above) since 34 − Φ(2!) < 1.
Similarly, overconfident individuals (ki = !) can invade a population of
Doves. The expected fitness of the invading individual is(
1
4
+
1
2
Φ(2!)
)
r (86)
which is clearly always greater than the fitness of a Dove in a population
full of Doves, since r > 0.
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Finally, a mixed equilibrium with a proportion of p Hawks (kj = ∞) and
1−p Doves (kj = −∞) is always vulnerable to invasion by an overconfident
individual (ki = !). We can see this by noting first the mix at equilibrium is
where p(r/2−c)+(1−p)r = 0 which simplifies to p = 2r/(2c+r). Then we
check the circumstances under which overconfident individuals beat both
Hawks and Doves:
p
(
r/2−
(
3
4
− Φ(2!)
)
c
)
+ (1− p)
(
1
4
+
1
2
Φ(2!)
)
r > 0 (87)
which, substituting for p, simplifies to:(
3
4
− 1
2
Φ(2!)
)
r +
(
3
2
Φ(2!)− 1
2
)
c > 0 (88)
and this is always true since r > 0, c > 0, and Φ < 1.
The intuition here is that Hawks always claim the resource, even in cases
where the opponent’s advantage is larger than the bias in an overconfident
individual’s assessment of the opponent. Under these conditions, overcon-
fident individuals will avoid the cost of conflicts they are sure to lose and
therefore will do better than Hawks. Similarly, Doves never claim the re-
source, even in cases where the opponent’s advantage is smaller than the
bias in an overconfident individual’s assessment of the opponent. Under
these conditions, overconfident individuals will gain the resource without
cost and do better than Doves.
Interestingly, this means that when a technology for assessing opponents
has evolved in a given population (even when assessment is biased!), the
widely used Hawk-Dove game may not be the best model and may gen-
erate misleading predictions about outcomes. However, it is important to
remember that there are many variations of the Hawk-Dove game that have
been proposed, such as those that allow individuals to share resources with
their opponent without conflict.
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5 Levels of Conflict in Different
Environments
A systematic exploration of the parameter space (as in Section 3 above)
also shows a positive relationship between the benefit/cost ratio and the
probability of conflict (Supplementary Fig. 4). It is not surprising that
overconfidence is itself associated with greater levels of conflict—in fact
that is close to our original assumption that overconfident individuals are
more willing to claim resources they may not be able to win. However, we
did not specify a direct relationship between resource benefits, costs, and
conflict; the strong positive relationship suggests that environments with
more valuable resources will generate more conflict.
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Supplementary Figure 4: Levels of conflict produced by equilibrium levels of
confidence (k∗) and varying benefit/cost ratios (r/c) for different degrees of un-
certainty (!) about the capabilities of competitors in the binomial (left panel)
and normal (right panel) models. Each point shows the results from a single
simulation where the cost, benefit, and degree of uncertainty were drawn from a
uniform distribution. There were 10,000 simulations in total. The results show
that conflict is increasing in both uncertainty and the relative value of contested
resources (r/c).
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The implication is that the environment (r/c) in some sense dictates the
optimal level of conflict that will maximize fitness over time and individ-
ual biases will adapt to match that level of conflict—even if that means
sometimes initiating conflicts that they may lose.
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6 A Note on Risk Preferences
In this section we show that individual behavior in the model is consistent
with an alternative motivation for behavior that is based on risk preferences
and the cognitively more demanding task of evaluating expected utility.
Suppose that individuals assume that all other individuals in the population
are like themselves in that 1) they know the cost of conflict and the benefit
of the resource, 2) they are capable of estimating the correct probability
that the opponent will claim the resource, 3) they are capable of estimat-
ing the correct probability they would win a conflict, conditional on their
error-prone subjective advantage assessment, and 4) they know the exact
distribution of the perception error.
If all these conditions are met, then individuals can calculate the expected
fitness of the risky choice E(frisky) and compare this to a risk preference
pii that defines how much additional fitness they require in expectation to
justify taking such a risk. In our model, since the sure thing payoff of not
making a claim is 0, then an individual with risk preferences makes a claim
if E(fclaim) > pii. This shows that risk tolerance decreases as pii increases.
To evaluate the expected value of the risky choice, recall that the variable
a denotes the advantage of individual i over individual j. If a > 0 then i
would win a conflict between them. Neither individual observes a because
of perception error. Instead, i perceives the advantage to be si = a+νi and
j perceives it to be sj = a+ νj (where ν is distributed Pr(ν = #) = 0.5 and
Pr(ν = −#) = 0.5). Since the true underlying advantage a is the same for
both individuals, we can define individual j’s perception as a function of
individual i’s perception. Moreover, the value depends on the distribution
of the perception errors which yields four equally likely conditions:
sj =

si if νi = # and νj = #
si + 2# if νi = # and νj = −#
si − 2# if νi = −# and νj = #
si if νi = −# and νj = −#
(89)
Recall that in the overconfidence equilibrium of the binomial model, k∗ = #
and therefore the decision to claim a resource if si+ki > 0 implies the same
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decision is made if si > −!. Now we can calculate the expected fitness of
claiming the resource conditional on different values of si.
If si < −!, then sj < ! and a < 0. Under these conditions, individual j
always makes a claim and individual i always loses a conflict. Since the
cost of conflict c > 0 is a sure thing, there is no risk premium and i never
claims the resource regardless of risk preferences.
If −! < si < 0, then the probability that j makes a claim is Pr(sj < !) = 34
since sj = si + 2! is the only one of the four conditions that yields a
contradiction. Of the three conditions in which individual j makes a claim,
all three imply a < 0. Therefore, j always wins a conflict. This means
the fitness payoff to i for making a claim is 14r − 34c. This is also the risk
premium, since we are comparing this outcome to the sure-thing fitness of
0 that results by not claiming the resource.
If 0 < si < !, then the probability that j makes a claim is Pr(sj < !) =
3
4
since sj = si + 2! is the only one of the four conditions that yields a
contradiction. Of the three conditions in which j makes a claim, two of
them (when sj = si) imply a > 0 and one of them (sj = si − 2!) implies
a < 0. Therefore, the probability that j wins a conflict is 23 . This means the
fitness payoff to i for making a claim is 34(
1
3(r−c)+ 23(−c))+ 14r. Simplifying,
the risk premium here is 12r − 34c.
If ! < si < 2!, then the probability that j makes a claim is Pr(sj < !) =
1
4
since sj = si − 2! is the only one of the four conditions that does not yield
a contradiction. However, this condition (sj = si − 2!) implies a < 0.
Therefore, j never wins a conflict. This means the fitness payoff to i for
making a claim is 14(r − c) + 34r. Simplifying, the risk premium is r − 14c.
Finally, if si > 2!, then sj > !. Under these conditions, individual j never
makes a claim which yields a sure thing payoff of r when individual i makes
a claim. Since there is no uncertainty, there is no risk premium.
By inspection, it is easy to see that the maximum risk preference that would
allow an individual to make the risky choice when si > −! is pii < 14r − 34c.
Any individual with a risk preference pii >
1
4r− 34c would switch to the sure
thing payoff in at least one case (when −! < si < 0). This means that in
the overconfidence equilibrium, any individual with such preferences would
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be less fit and could not survive, just as individuals with ki < ! could not
survive. So in equilibrium only individuals with sufficiently low pii (i.e.
those of sufficient risk tolerance) are sustainable.
What these calculations show is that the simple overconfidence heuristic can
cause individuals to behave as if they are calculating the expected outcome
of a risky choice under a specific set of assumptions about their opponents
and comparing it to a required risk premium. As we discuss in the main
paper, evolution may have favoured the simpler mechanism to achieve the
same result.
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7 Populations with a Mix of Unbiased
Types (kj = 0) and Very Overconfident Types
(kj = 2!) Are Not Stable
Overconfident individuals can invade a population if they get as much (or
more) fitness when paired against a member of that population as that
member gets when paired against itself. Suppose we have an underconfi-
dent population where each individual has confidence level kj = −!. Under
what conditions could an overconfident indvidual (ki = !) invade this popu-
lation? We can use equations (1) and (5) to derive an expected fitness for an
overconfident individual that is matched with an underconfident individual:(
3
8
+
1
4
Φ(2!)
)
r −
(
1
4
Φ(2!)− 1
8
)
c (90)
This fitness is greater than the average fitness for individuals in a monomor-
phic population of underconfident individuals (equation (6)) when:
r
c
>
1
3
(91)
Now suppose that the population originally contains individuals that are
all unbiased (kj = 0). We use equations (1) and (5) to derive an expected
fitness for an overconfident individual that is matched with an unbiased
individual:(
3
8
+
1
4
Φ(!)
)
r −
(
1
2
Φ(2!) +
1
4
Φ(!)− 3
8
)
c (92)
This fitness is greater than the average fitness for individuals in a monomor-
phic population of unbiased individuals (equation (6)) when:
r
c
>
Φ(2!)
Φ(!)− 12
− 1
2
(93)
which is clearly always possible when ! is positive since r and c are positive.
For very small ! the benefit/cost ratio needed is very large, but this quickly
asymptotes to 32 as ! increases (for example, the condition is
r
c > 2.37
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when ! = 1 if φ is distributed standard normal). The implication is that
a benefit/cost ratio always exists in which overconfident individuals can
invade a population of unbiased individuals, and for moderate degrees of
uncertainty about opponent capabilities the benefit/cost ratio need not be
very high to ensure that overconfident individuals can do better than their
unbiased peers.
Finally, we show that overconfident individuals (kj = !) can always invade
a mixed population of very overconfident (kj = 2!) and unbiased (kj = 0)
individuals. Given an equilibrium population with proportion 0 < p < 1
unbiased types and proportion 1−p very overconfident types, the following
statement must be true in order for an overconfident type to invade:
pE(f |ki = !, kj = 0) + (1− p)E(f |ki = !, kj = 2!) >
pE(f |ki = 2!, kj = 0) + (1− p)E(f |ki = 2!, kj = 2!) (94)
We use equations (1) and (5) to derive each of the payoffs in this equation,
and simplifying yields the following inequality:
(Φ(!)− Φ(0))rp+ (2(Φ(3!)− Φ(2!)) + (Φ(!)− Φ(0))))cp+
2((Φ(3!)− Φ(2!)) + (Φ(!)− Φ(0)))c(1− p) > 0 (95)
Notice that all terms on the L.H.S. are positive, and therefore the statement
is always true. Therefore no mixed population of very overconfident (kj =
2!) and unbiased (kj = 0) types can resist invasion by an overconfident
individual (kj = !).
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